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Abstract: 
We  provide  experimental  evidence  on  how u n e q u a l  a c c e s s  t o  p e r f o r m a n c e  e n h a n c i n g  
education affects demand for redistribution. People earn money in a real effort experiment 
and can then decide how to distribute it among themselves and another subjects. We compare 
situations in which randomly chosen people get access to performance enhancing education 
with situations in which either only luck or only performance determines outcome. We find 
that  unequal  opportunities  evoke  a  preference  for redistribution  that  is  comparable  to  the 
situation when luck alone determines the allocation. However, people with unequal access to 
education are more likely to disagree about the appropriate distribution. 
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1  Introduction 
 
How do people redistribute if inequality is caused by unequal access to education? A huge 
literature shows that people are more willing to accept inequality in incomes if it results from 
hard work rather than from pure luck.
1 Education is ambiguous in these dimensions. Random 
processes like high innate abilities or a favorable socio-economic environment enhance the 
chances to get education but the student herself still has to provide effort in order to acquire 
and  improve  her  skill.  Some  students  study  hard  but  others  relax.  Furthermore,  distorted 
beliefs confuse the assessment of distributional preferences. People may argue in favor of 
redistribution  because  they  prefer  equal  incomes  or  because  they  incorrectly  perceive  the 
access to education as unfair. Alesina and Glaeser (2005, p. 5) argue that beliefs do not reflect 
the actual (in)equality of opportunities correctly. Instead, people base their beliefs on personal 
experiences  rather  than  on  econometric  studies ( P i k e t t y ,  1 9 9 5 )  a n d  t h e y  h a v e  a  b i a s e d  
perception of these experiences (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Therefore, our study uses an 
experiment to shed light on the question how people evaluate unequal access to education. 
We  investigate  the  demand  for  post-educational  redistribution  with  a  real-effort 
experiment. In our experiment, subjects are paired in groups of two. In a quiz task they create 
an output, which they contribute to a common pool. Then, they negotiate how to distribute 
their joint output. In all treatments, subjects get the opportunity to learn some of the questions 
of the quiz. Our focus is on the education treatments in which one of the two subjects in a 
group gets a better education because she can learn more relevant questions. As the number of 
correctly  answered  general  knowledge  questions  determines  a  subjectﾒ’s  contribution, 
knowledge was the relevant skill in this experiment. However, since one randomly chosen 
subject in each group in the education treatments received additional knowledge, it is obvious 
that  luck  was  also  relevant  for  contributions.  The  two  education  treatments  differed  with 
respect to the learning time. With short education subjects had to concentrate more in order to 
reap the benefits of the learning advantage. Long education allowed them to learn rather 
leisurely. We used two benchmark treatments in which we controlled the importance of skill 
and luck. As one benchmark we use a treatment, the skill treatment, in which a subjectﾒ’s 
contribution depends only on her ex-ante skills. A second benchmark is provided by the luck 
treatment, in which a lottery determines the contribution.  
                                                 
1 See for example the studies by Hoffman et al. (1994) , Burrows and Loomes (1994) , Ruffle (1998) , Konow 
(2003), or Durante and Putterman (2009). 3 
 
The control treatments in our study relate to two principles of distributive justice, the 
egalitarian one and the desert-based one. Strict egalitarianism ﾓ“advocates the allocation of 
equal material goods to all members of societyﾔ” (Lamont and Favor, (2007) in the online 
version  of  the  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy).  According  to  the  desert  principle, 
people should be rewarded according to the value of their contribution to the social product.
2 
This means that this principle and similar meritocratic ideas have a concept of equality of 
opportunity rather than equality of outcome. If unequal opportunities exist then it is important 
to identify if and how far a person is accountable for an outcome. Roemer (1998) argues that 
accountability requires a comparison of people with the same exogenous characteristics.
3 The 
share that a person gets should only increase in her relative contribution, i.e. the share of an 
educated person should be measured in relation to her educated peers and the share of an 
uneducated persons should be measured relative to other uneducated persons. Since education 
in our experiment is randomly assigned, educated people should, on average, receive the same 
share as uneducated people even if they contribute more than uneducated people.  
As mentioned above, several studies have shown that people opt for more egalitarian 
distributions once luck rather than meritocratic criteria determine an outcome (see footnote 1). 
Cappelen et al. (2007) used distribution decisions after an investment period with unequal 
rates of returns and investigated the importance of different fairness principles. They provide 
evidence  for  heterogeneity  in  the  application  of  fairness  principles  among  their  subjects. 
Konow (2000; 2003) provides detailed positive analyses on the accountability principle.  
In our study, we implement unequal access to education, which creates an ambiguous 
situation with respect to these fairness principles. On the one hand, luck is relevant for the 
unequal access to education; on the other hand, performance alone determines the outcome 
after education has been received. Thus, with our study we can assess the importance of 
different fairness principle in this situation. We can investigate whether the fairness norms 
that  are  applied  in  situations  with  equal  opportunities  or  purely  randomly  determined 
investments prevail in a situation of inequality of opportunities,
4. Such a comparison reveals 
whether  people  make  claims  for  more  or  less  redistribution  once  they  have  correct 
information  about  the  determinants  of  inequalities  in  opportunities. T h i s  c o m p a r i s o n  i s  
                                                 
2 It is important to distinguish between the desert principle and the provision of incentives. The latter implies a 
provision  on  the  distribution  of  outcome  before  production  has  taken  place  while  the  former  considers  a 
distribution after production has taken place.  
3 ﾓ“I say it is morally wrong to hold a person accountable for not doing something that it would have been 
unreasonable for a person in his circumstances to have doneﾔ” (p. 18).  
4 Inequity averse people in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do not accept inequality in outcomes even if the 
differences depend on choices only. On the other hand, libertarian thinkers such as Hayek (1960) are reluctant to 
accept redistribution even if luck has a strong impact on economic outcomes.   4 
 
particularly important in the context of inequalities in the access to education. Educational 
choices depend on skills (or abilities) which are, at least to a certain  degree,  exogenous, 
unobservable and unevenly distributed productivity factors. Nevertheless, skill premiums are 
widely tolerated and meritocratic societies claim that the most able citizens do constitute their 
elite.  
We expected redistribution in the situation of unequal opportunities to be in between the 
control treatments, in which luck or skill alone determines outcome. Interestingly though, our 
results reveal that subjectsﾒ’ responses to unequal learning opportunities are similar to their 
responses when luck alone determines output. This means that if the access to education is 
saliently due to luck, people apply more egalitarian than desert based fairness principles. We 
also observe conflicting distribution norms between educated and uneducated participants. 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section presents the experimental design. 
Afterwards,  we  provide  behavioral  predictions.  Section  4  presents  the  results  of  the 
experiment. Section 5 summarizes the paper and provides concluding comments. 
 
2  Experimental design 
 
We start with an overview of the experiment and, then explain all the steps in detail. The key 
feature of our design is the generation of unequal access to education. In our experiment, 
subjects have to solve multiple choice knowledge questions. As a preparation, they can learn 
some of them. We generate unequal access to education by differentiating how many of the 
questions are useful, i.e., how many of the questions are relevant in the real effort task. In 
order to manipulate the importance of the education for performance, we implemented two 
situations. In one situation, the long education treatment subjects could learn for 15 minutes, 
while in the short education treatment, subjects could learn for only 4 minutes. The latter 
condition creates higher variance within the educated group. Thus, high performance within 
the educated group is less associated with luck and could be considered as more deserved. 
The production in the multiple choice question task determined the subjectﾒ’s contribution to a 
common pool. Subjects were informed about each otherﾒ’s contribution and could bargain how 
to  share  the  common  pool.  The  control  treatments  differ  in  how  the  contribution  to  the 
common pool is determined: In the skill treatment, the individual contribution of a subject to 
the joint output was determined by her skills (more specifically her general knowledge). In the 
luck treatment, luck determined the individual contribution. We will now present the three 5 
 
phases of the experiment in detail. The phases are, the learning phase, the production and 
contribution phase, and the negotiation phase.  
 
Learning 
All subjects learned the correct answers for 60 knowledge questions. We used multiple 
choice versions of questions from the German standard version of the quiz game ﾓ“Trivial 
Pursuitﾔ” which includes questions on geography, entertainment, history, arts and literature, 
science and technology as well as sports. The learning phase lasted for 15 minutes. In the 
short education treatment this time was reduced to 4 minutes. 
In the learning phase, subjects could learn the correct answer to 60 questions. In this 
phase only the correct answer was displayed- The treatments differed in how many of the 
learned questions were relevant in the production phase. In the skill treatment, 5% of the 
questions from the learning period (i.e. 3 out of 60) reappeared in the production period. In 
both  education  treatments,  one  member  in  each  group  had  learned  5%  of  the  relevant 
questions while the other one had learned 95% (i.e. 57 out of 60 questions). In the luck 
treatment,  each  subject  learned  50%  of  the  relevant  questions.  In  the  skill  and  the  luck 
treatment, the subjects were informed about the number of relevant questions at the beginning 
of the learning period. In the education treatments, the subjects were initially informed about 
the possible number of relevant questions. The actual assignment of the number of relevant 
questions and the information of the subjects occurred immediately after the learning period 
via the throw of a die. 
Production and contribution to the common pool 
In the production phase lasted for 15 minutes in all treatments. Each subject had to answer 60 
knowledge questions by choosing between 4 possible answers. Only one of the answers was 
correct.  As  Trivial  Pursuit  provides  only  the  correct  answers,  the  authors  of  this  paper 
developed the alternatives on their own. The experiment included two payment components. 
The first component was dependent on the own absolute performance. A subject received 0.2 
points for a correct answer, with one point being the equivalent of 0.15 euro (about 0.23 US 
dollar at the time of the experiment). A wrong answer implied a loss of 0.2 points. The 
subjects could also choose to leave a question unanswered. But once the subjects had made 
their choice for a question they could not return to that question. An unanswered question did 
not affect the number of points. If more answers were wrong than right, the payment was 
deducted from the show-up fee of 4 euro. The second payment component was a subjects 
share from the common pool. The negotiation procedure will be discussed below.  6 
 
A  subject´s  contribution  to  the  common  pool  was  determined  by  the  subjectﾒ’s  rank 
among  fellow  participants  in  the  session.  In  the  skill  and  the  education  treatments, 
performance determined the rank, i.e., a more productive subject cont ributed more to the 
common pool. The subject with the lowest productivity in a session contributed 10 points, the 
subject  with  the  second  lowest  productivity  20  points  and  so  on.  In  sessions  with  24 
participants, the most productive participant contributed 240 points. We did not use the earned 
points  as  performance  measure  since  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  get  comparable 
performance distributions across the treatments.  
In  the  luck  treatment,  in  each  session  a  two-stage  random  process  determined  the 
individual contributions of the 24 subjects to the common pool in their specific group. A die 
determined high (contribution > 120 points) and low contributors ( 120 points). Half of the 
subjects were in either condition. Then, a lottery specified the actual size of the individual 
contributions
5.  The  realizations  were  independent  of  the  individual  productivity.  Hence, 
subjects in the luck treatment benefited from the production phase only via the income to their 
private account. 
After production, the subjects were matched into groups of two. In the skill treatment, 
the  matching  occurred  at  random.  In  the  luck  treatment,  each  group  included  one  high 
contributor to the common pool and one low contributor. In the education treatment, one 
educated person was always matched with one uneducated person. The high differences in 
learned questions in the long education treatment ensured that all educated subjects were also 
high contributors. In the short education, 18 out of 24 groups included one educated high 
contributor and one uneducated low contributor. We only use these groups for our analysis. 
These groups now negotiated about the distribution of the common pool (see below). Table 1 
summarizes the different treatments with respect to their characteristics in the learning and 
production phases. 
                                                 
5 120 points or less in the case of low contributors, 130 points or more in the case of high contributors. The 
possible contributions were ranked in steps of 10 points, with 10 as the lowest possible contribution and 240 as 
the highest possible one. 7 
 
 
Table 1: The phases of the experiment and the experimental treatments 
 
Phases  Skill Treatment  Education Treatments  Luck Treatment 




5%  are  relevant  for 
production 
 
15 minutes  
5%  are  relevant  for 
one group member 
95%  are  relevant  for 
the  other  group 
member 
 
Long ed.: 15 minutes 
Short Ed: 4 minutes 









60 questions to be answered 
0.2 points reward for a correct answer. 
0.2 points deduction for a wrong answer. 
15 minutes time 
 
Contribution 
to  common 
pool 
The  number  of  earned  points  influences  the 
contribution  
Actual  contribution  between  10  and  240 
according  to  a  subjectﾒ’s  productivity  rank 
among the other subjects in the session 
 
Actual  contribution 
between  10  and  240 





We  analyze  groups 
with  one  high 
contributor  and  one 
low contributor, 
 
We analyze groups with 
one  educated  high 
contributor  and  one 
uneducated  low 
contributor. 
 
One  high  contributor 
(>120 points) and one 
low contributor ( 120 
points) 
  
Negotiation  Each group member makes a proposal and a minimum demand. 
One of the two proposals is selected. 
The proposal is accepted if it exceeds  




The negotiation procedure was identical in all treatments. At the beginning of the phase all 
subjects were informed about the size of the common pool and the share they contributed to it. 
After that, each subject decided as a proposer and as a demander. In the former role, the 
subject proposed how to distribute the common pool by allocating percentage points to herself 
and the other group member. As a demander, the subject stated the minimum share for herself 
for accepting the proposal of the other player. A random mechanism determined which player 
in the group was the proposer. If the allotted share to the demander matched or exceeded the 
stated minimum, the proposal was accepted and the pool divided accordingly. If the allotted 
share was below the demand the negotiation failed in this round. This also happened when the 
proposal of the other player would have been accepted. 
If the negotiation failed, the procedure was repeated with a smaller common pool. Six 
points were deducted from the common pool after each round with a failed negotiation. Again 
a random mechanism decided whose proposal and whose demand was to be considered. All 
negotiations finished after a proposal had been accepted. No group exhausted their pool in the 
negotiations. 
 
3  Behavioral predictions 
Let us first consider standard prediction in the negotiation stage. Before knowing their type, 
subjects have the same bargaining power and therefore they can and will enforce to get half of 
the pie. Thus, if the cake size equals c, rational and selfish subjects accept a proposal of least 
c/2-3. Therefore, this offer will be made. This implies that proposals and demands should not 
differ  within  and  across  the  treatment  groups.  However,  we  expect  that  principles  of 
distributive  justice  shape  offers  and  minimum  demands  in  specific  ways  within  each 
treatment. 
Several  experimental  studies  have  shown  how  luck  and  skill  influence  distribution 
preferences and negotiation outcomes (see for example Hoffman et al., (1994), Burrows and 
Loomes  (1994),  Ruffle  (1998),  Konow  (2003),  or  Durante  and  Putterman  (2009)).  These 
studies suggest that distributional norms differ between the luck and the skill treatment, in 
particular more redistribution in the luck than in the skill treatment. Hence, we expect the 
following  empirical  results  in  our  experiment.  First,  low  (high)  contributors  make  higher 
(lower) minimum demands in the luck treatment than in the skill treatment. Second, low 
(high) contributors propose less (more) generous distributions to the other group member in 
the  luck  treatment  than  in  the  skill  treatment.  This  implies  that  the  correlation  between 9 
 
proposals/demands and a subjectﾒ’s contributions to the common pool is significantly higher in 
the skill treatment than in the luck treatment.  
In  the  education  treatments i t  i s  a m b i g u o u s  w h e t h e r  t h e  egalitarian  or  the  desert 
principles has to be applied. The assignment of productivity-enhancing education occurs at 
random  and  supports  the  application  of  the  egalitarian  principle.  However,  the  subjectﾒ’s 
production determines her contribution to the common pool. This means that each individual 
has  an  impact  on  the  size  of  the  common  pool  which  could  provide  a  motive  for  the 
application of the desert principle. Thus, our experimental setup provides a clean environment 
for testing whether subjects consider a higher contribution via randomly assigned education as 
luck  or  as  merit.  We  expect  that  demands a n d  p r o p o s a l s  i n  t h e  e d u c a t i o n  t r e a t m e n t s  a r e  
between those of the skill treatment and those of the luck treatment. Because skills and effort 
are more important in the short education treatment, we expect the results from this treatment 
to be closer to the results in the skill treatment than the results from the long education 
treatment. It is an open question whether behavior in the education treatments is closer to the 
luck or to the skill treatment. If subject apply the fairness principle in a self-serving way (as 
observed in Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996)), then high contributors would apply the desert 
principle  and  their  behavior  would  be  comparable  to  the  skill  treatment,  and  the  low 
contributors would apply the egalitarian principle and their behavior would be comparable to 
the luck treatment. Thus, in the education treatments conflicts between the two parties should 
be more frequent and agreement more difficult than in the other two treatments. 
 
4  Procedure and Results 
The experiment was conducted at the lakelab at the University of Konstanz. We programmed 
the experiment with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruited 190 participants among the 
students of the University using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). All subjects received a show up-fee 
of 4 Euros (about 5.75 US-dollars at the time of the experiment (Autumn 2009 and Spring 
2010)) and additionally 0.15 Euros per experimental point. In each treatment, all subjects 
received  identical  instructions,  including  comprehension  questions.  Once  all  subjects  had 
answered  the  questions  correctly,  the  experimenter  summarized  the  experiment  using  a 
standardized text. All instructions were framed in a neutral way; they are attached in the 
appendix. We conducted 12 sessions in total, eleven with 24 subjects per session. One session 
in the skill treatment included only 22 participants. Subjects earned on average 22.93 Euros, 
including the show up fee. 10 
 
Table  2  shows  the  number  of  subjects  and  the  average  contribution  of  the  high 
contributor in each treatment. A high contributor is a person whose contribution is in the 
higher  half  of  the  contribution, t h e  o t h e r s  c o n t r i b u t o r s  a r e  low  contributors.  In  the  luck 
treatment, we ensured by design that all groups included one high and one low contributor. In 
the skill treatments, we consider only subjects in those groups that included one high and one 
low contributor. In the education treatments the high contributor also had to be the educated 
one for our analysis. In order to keep the number of relevant observations comparable across 
treatments, we recruited twice as many subjects in the skill treatment and one third more 
subjects in the short education treatment compared to the other treatments. The assignment of 
the contribution based on the rank ensures that the size of the common pool is comparable 
across all treatments. Therefore, we can denote the contribution in percentage points. The 
difference  in  mean  contribution  of  high  contributors  between  the  skill  and  the  education 
treatment is not significant (p = .323, according to the Wilcoxon rank sum test).  
 
Table 2: 
Number of subjects, common pool sizes and mean contribution of high contributors (in 
percentages) across the treatments 
Treatment  Subjects  Groups  Common pool size  Contribution of the high 
contributor* 
  Mean  St.Dev  Mean   St. Dev 
Skill       
   All obs.  142  71  246.90  100.10  68.26%  12.35 
   Relevant**  72  35  254.00  44.07  72.83%  10.62 
Short Education     
   All obs.  96  48  250  66.75  74.01%  11.24 
   Relevant**  76  38  252.89  51.67  76.33%  9.92 
Education  72  36  250  60.62  75.48%  9.74 
Luck  72  36  250  52.92  75.21%  11.11 
*The high contributor are the subjects whose contribution was in the upper half within the session.  
**In the skill and short education treatments, the relevant observations are the subjects in groups with one high 
and one low contributor. These groups are comparable with the other treatments. 
 
First, we investigate whether treatments differ with respect to the minimum demands. Table 3 
provides the minimum demands of high and low contributors and their proposed share for 11 
 
themselves in each treatment. The treatments are ordered according to our hypotheses with 
respect to the importance of the meritocratic principle in the distribution.  
Table 3: 
First round minimum demands and proposals of high and low contributors across the 
treatments 
Treatment  Subjects  Minimum demand of the high 
contributors 
Proposal of the high 
contributors for herself
 M e a n  S t .   D e v   M e a n     S t .   D e v  
Skill  35  66.14%  9.41  68.06%  11.57 
Short Education  38  64.00%  10.90  66.11%  13.93 
Long Education  36  61.42%  11.76  66.42%  11.09 
Luck  36  59.39%  10.48  63.33%  11.21 
    
  
Minimum demand of the low 
contributor 
Proposal of the low 
contributor for herself 
    Mean  St. Dev  Mean  St. Dev 
Skill  35  34.20%  9.89  37.62%  10.75 
Short Education  38  40.76%  11.83  45.26%  15.89 
Long Education  36  40.25%  10.57  41.69%  9.95 
Luck  36  37.67%  10.25  42.47%  11.16 
Minimum Demand: Minimum share of the common pool for the demanding subject. 
Proposal: Proposed share of the common pool for herself (i.e. not for the other group member).  
 
We  find  that  purely  egalitarian  motives  do  not  apply  in  any  context. I n  a l l  t r e a t m e n t s ,  
demands and proposals differ significantly from an equal split (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p 
<.001 for demands in all treatments, p <.016 for proposals in all treatments). This means that 
low contributors demand and propose smaller shares for themselves than high contributors do. 
The results confirm the existence of ﾓ“moral property rightsﾔ” (Gächter and Riedl, 2005). Most 
subjects accept that a randomly determined large contribution implies an entitlement to a 
rather high share of the common pool, even if luck determined contributions. This result also 
reveals  that  subjects  do  not  consider  Roemerﾒ’s  (1998)  accountability  criterion.  Educated 
group members receive higher shares even though they got their training only by chance. 
We  also  find  no  evidence  for  purely  meritocratic  distributions.  Low  contributors 
demand a higher share than they actually contributed while high contributors demands are 
lower  than  their  contributions  (Wilcoxon  signed-rank  test,  p < . 0 0 1  f o r  d e m a n d s  i n  a l l  12 
 
treatments, the same results apply for proposals). These results reveal a consensus among 
subjects in all treatments that neither purely egalitarian  or  purely  meritocratic criteria for 
distributions should prevail in any context. This consensus limits the scope for treatment 
differences because decisions of high and low contributors are less likely to differ across the 
treatments. 
Demands  of  the  high  contributors  are  exactly i n  t h e  e x p e c t e d  d i r e c t i o n  a c r o s s  t h e  
treatments. They are highest in the skill treatment, lowest in the luck treatment and in between 
in the education treatments. Further, they are higher in the short education treatment than in 
the long education treatment. However, not all of the differences are statistically significant. 
The difference between the skill treatment and the luck treatment is statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = .006), the same holds for the difference in demands of high 
contributors in the short education and luck treatments (p = .046). With respect to proposals, 
we find that the education treatments are within the luck and skill treatments, but also here, 
not all differences are significant. Proposals of high contributors differ significantly between 
the  luck  and  the  skill  treatment  (p  =  0.044; a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  W i l c o x o n  r a n k - s u m  t e s t ) .  
Proposals of high contributors with short education are insignificantly higher than in the luck 
treatment (p = .116). All other comparisons are insignificant. 
Regarding  the  low  contributors,  the  pattern l o o k s  s o m e w h a t  d i fferent.  Proposal  and 
demand  are  closer  to  the  luck  condition  than t o  t h e  s k i l l  c o n d i t i on  and  short  education 
treatment  and  for  the  proposals,  the  choices  are  even  more  egalitarian  then  in  the  luck 
conditions. With respect to statistical significance, we can show that the demands of low 
contributors  in  the  skill  treatment  and  in  both  education  treatments  differ  significantly 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, p = .014 and 0.023). With respect to the proposals, low contributors 
in the skill treatment do not make significantly more generous proposals than those in the luck 
and the long education treatments. The difference in low contributorsﾒ’ proposals between the 
skill and the short education treatment is significant (p = .040).  
These results suggest that there is a larger conflict of norms in the education treatments 
than in the skill and the luck treatment. This is actually the case. Acceptance rates of first 
round  proposals  were  similar  in  the  skill  and  in  the  luck  treatment  (51.4%  and  55.6%, 
respectively) but significantly lower in the education treatment (37.5%, in the long education 
treatment and 35.5% in the short education treatments, all p<.10, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). 
Even  though  there  was  a  larger  conflict  in  the  first  round,  people  did  not  need  more 
bargaining rounds in the education treatments (1.85 rounds in the skill treatment, 2.03 in the 13 
 
long education treatment, 2.17 in the luck treatment and 2.61 in the short education treatment. 
None of the treatment differences is significant).  
The relationship between proposals (and own minimum demands, respectively) and the 
contribution to the common pool provides more specific information about differences in 
distribution norms between the three treatments. If the egalitarian norm is prevalent, proposals 
and demands should equal to 50% independent of the individuals contributions. If people 
follow  the  desert  norm,  the  peopleﾒ’s  share  should  equal  their  contribution.  Thus,  the 
coefficient  of  an  OLS  estimations  of  the  proposed  share  for  the  other  player  (and  own 
minimum demand, respectively) with the own share of production as the single independent 
variable informs us about the relative importance of the two norms. This coefficient can be 
interpreted as the average share of the income that is not redistributed. If all subjects follow 
the equity norm, the coefficient equals zero; if all follow the desert norm, it equals one. As 
above,  we  only  use  the  proposals  and  demands  from  the  first  round.  Table  4  shows  the 
relationship in the four treatments. Note that we subtract 50% from proposals, demands and 
production shares. Thus, the constant term in the regression output shows how proposals and 




 OLS estimations of first round proposals and demands in the different treatments (in %) 
Dependent Variable  Proposed Share for herself  
(-50%) 
Minimum Demand  
(-50%) 
  Skill Treatment 
Share of Production (-50%)  .672 (.040)***  .681 (.035)*** 
Constant  2.843 (.997)***  .171 (.886) 
Adjusted R²  .806  .843 
  Short Education Treatment 
Share of Production (-50%)  .380 (.077)***  .426 (.045)*** 
Constant  5.684 (1.693)***  2.382 (1.260)* 
Adjusted R²  .341  .544 
  Long Education Treatment 
Share of Production (-50%)  .485 (.041)***  .418 (.045)*** 
Constant  4.056 (1.110)***  .833 (1.220) 
Adjusted R²  .665  .548 
  Luck Treatment 
Share of Production (-50%)  .408 (.045)***  .428 (.040)*** 
Constant  2.903 (1.224)**  -1.472 (1.094) 
Adjusted R²  .538  .618 
*** significance level p<.01; ** p<.05; N: 70 in skill, 76 in short education, 72 each in long 
education and luck, standard errors in parentheses 
 
Again the results confirm the existence of ﾓ“moral property rightsﾔ” (Gächter and Riedl, 2002), 
as they show a strong relationship between contributions and proposals (demands) even in the 
luck treatment. The production coefficients for proposals and demands are remarkably similar 
within  each  treatment.  In  order  to  estimate  treatment  differences  regarding  the  impact  of 
production shares on demands and proposals, we use interaction terms between the treatment 
variables and a subjectﾒ’s share of production (see Table 5). 15 
 
Table 5: OLS estimations of first round proposals and demands across all treatments. (in 
%),  
 
Reference  Short Education Treatment 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Proposed Share  
for herself (-50%) 
Minimum Demand 
(-50%) 
Share of Production (-50%)  .380 (.045)***  .426 (.039)*** 
Luck  -2.781 (1.816)  -3.854 (1.580)** 
Luck ൈ Share of Production (-50%)  .028 (.065)  .002 (.057) 
Skill  -2.841 (1.834)  -2.210 (1.596) 
Skill ൈ Share of Production (-50%)  .292 (.069)***  .254 (.060)*** 
Long Education  -1.629 (1.816)  -1.548 (1.580) 
Long ൈ Share of Production (-50%)  .105 (.065)  -.009 (.057) 
Constant  5.684 (1.270)***  2.382 (1.105)** 
Adjusted R²  .584  .653 
*** significance level p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10; N = 290 in both OLS estimations, standard errors in 
parentheses. The interaction terms (Luck ൈ Share of Production, Skill ൈ Share of Production, Long ൈ Share of 
Production) indicate if the impact of production shares on demands and proposals differs significantly across 
the treatments.  
 
The results show that individual contributions are more relevant for proposals and demands in 
the skill treatment than in the other treatments. The impact of contributions on demands and 
proposals are remarkably similar in both education treatments and the luck treatment. This 
result  implies  that  subjects  consider  only  the  random  access  to  education  but  not  the 
differences in performance within each educational group when they make their proposals and 
demands in the education treatment.  
 
 
5  Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate how people respond to one of the most important sources of 
economic inequality, unequal access to education. We induce unequal opportunities with a 
real-effort experiment in which some people get random access to training. Depending on the 
treatment, luck, skill or random access to skill-enhancing education determined the size of the 
individual contributions. Our subjects knew about these determinants of contribution. Due to 
the experimental design, the size of individual contributions and the common pool did not 16 
 
vary systematically across the treatments. Therefore, we could eliminate crucial confounds 
that restrict the analysis of inequalities of opportunities in previous survey and experimental 
studies.  
We do observe that neither completely egalitarian proposals nor completely meritocratic 
proposals dominate. In all treatments, proposals and demands are correlated with individual 
contributions to the common pool, but the correlation is not perfect. Interestingly, people 
partly respect the individual contributions, even if luck rather than innate or acquired skills 
determine the size of these contributions. Individual contributions matter more when innate 
skill rather than luck determines outcomes. Random access to skill-enhancing education turns 
out to be perceived differently by those who benefit from the better education and those who 
get the worse education. Both groups tend towards the norm that is in their self interest. While 
those who get the better education apply a norm that is closer to the desert norm, subjects 
without access to such education make similar demands and proposals as those subjects with a 
randomly determined contribution. We find that the average share of redistribution is very 
similar in the luck treatment and in the education treatments, and significantly higher than in 
the  skill  treatment.  This  similarity  reveals  that  when  the  inequality  in  educational 
opportunities  is  salient,  meritocratic  criteria  get  out  of  focus.  Our  results  show  that 
redistribution of outputs that are produced by saliently unequal opportunities is similar to 
redistribution after output created by luck alone. However, this is a fragile consensus. With 
shorter learning time, demands and proposals of educated high proposers shift away from 
those of their fellows in the luck treatment. 
Empirical studies show that if more people believe that luck determines income, then 
the  demand  for  redistribution  is  higher.
6 O u r  e x p e r i m e n t a l  r e s u l t s  r e v e a l  a n d  d i s t i n g u i s h  
underlying  behavioral  phenomena  that  shape  this  general  trend.  We  observe  that  people 
accept moral property rights even if luck alone determines contributions. Second, subjects 
always have a preference for redistribution even in the most meritocratic context. These two 
phenomena  make  distributional  relatively  similar  across  different  contexts  and  always 
significantly different from purely egalitarian or meritocratic ideals. Within these limits, the 
impact of skills on income generation is almost irrelevant if the link between luck and access 
to relevant skills is very salient. This result is particularly striking because subjects were fully 
aware that meritocratic criteria still mattered in this context. If people have to work relatively 
                                                 
6 Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that, in the United States at least, preferences for redistribution depend 
crucially on the individual belief in equal opportunity. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that international 
differences in beliefs about the source of inequality explain the differences in redistributive characteristics of tax 
regimes.  17 
 
hard in order to acquire the benefits of education, then the beneficiaries are less likely to 
consider the role of luck. In consequence, people disagree more often about what constitutes a 
fair distribution of income. 
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General Instructions for all participants (translated from German) 
Welcome to this economic experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully you 
will receive money in addition to the 4 euro show-up fee. Your earnings depend on your 
decisions and the decisions of other participants. Hence, please read the instructions carefully. 
If you have any questions please contact us before the actual experiment starts. 
During  the  experiment,  it  is  forbidden  to  talk  with  the  other  participants. W e  w i l l  
exclude you from this experiment and any payment if you violate this rule. 
During the experiment we use points instead of euros. We calculate all your earnings in points 
and exchange them into Euros at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is  
1 point = 0,15 euro  
At the end of the experiment, we will pay you all your points and the show-up fee of 4 euros 
in cash. 
Now we will explain the precise procedure of the experiment. 
Summary 
In this experiment you are a member in a group of 2 persons. The experiment has three 
phases. First comes a learning phase in which you can acquire knowledge. In the following 
production phase both members of the group can earn points by using their knowledge.  
Skill Treatment  Education Treatment  Luck Treatment 
Each person gets 10% of his produced 
points  into  a  private  account.  Each 
person  earns  additional  rank  points 
which  depend  on  the  production  of 
this  person  in  comparison  with  all 
other participants. 
The  group  members  differ 
with  respect  to  the  benefit 
they  receive  from  the 
learning  period.  A  die 
determines  how  much  each 
member  benefits.  Each 
person  gets  10%  of  his 
produced points in a private 
account.  Each  person  earns 
additional rank points which 
depend on the production of 
this  person  in  comparison 
with all other participants. 
The remaining points will be 
substituted by points that you 
draw from an urn and which 
you have to pay into a group 
account. There is an urn with 
high point scores and an urn 
with low ones. A die decides 
from  which  urn  you  can 
draw. 
 
Each  person  has  to  pay  these  rank  points  into  a  group  account.  In  the  third  phase,  the 
bargaining  phase,  the  two  group  members  negotiate  about  the  distribution  of  this  group 
account. 
Learning phase  19 
 
In the learning phase you can prepare for the production phase. In the production phase your 
earnings increase in the number of correctly answered knowledge questions. In the learning  
phase you can learn some of these correct answers. 
We derived the questions from the game ﾓ“trivial pursuitﾔ” and transformed them into multiple 
choice  questions  with  four  possible  answers.  Y o u  c a n  a l s o  c h o o s e  t h e  o p t i o n  ﾓ“ I  d o  n o t  
knowﾔ”. We chose the questions randomly; they cover all areas of knowledge. In the learning 
phase, you can learn 60 questions and their corresponding correct answers. 
The screen is structured as follows: 
 
There are 6 pages with 10 questions each on your screen. You can go from one page to 
another as you wish. The red buttons show you the correct answer for a specific question. In 
the top right corner you can see the remaining time. You have 15 minutes time (900 sec.). 
Note that the questions in the production phase show up in a random sequence. 
You may not take notes, if you do we will exclude you from the experiment. After 15 minutes 
you will move automatically into the production phase. 
 
Lottery (only in the education treatment) 
At the beginning of the production phase, a die determines which group member benefits 
more strongly from the learning period. In each group, one member has learned 95% of the 
correct answers, the other member learns only 5% of them. 20 
 
A randomly chosen person in this room will throw a six sided die and type into her computer 
whether the number is odd or even. You will see on your screen how many answers you will 
learn with an odd number and how many with an even one. 
Production phase 
 
The production phase lasts 15 minutes. You can earn points by answering 60 knowledge 
points correctly during this time.  
Skill Treatment  Education Treatment  Luck Treatment 
You  have  learned  5%  of  these 
questions. 
The  die  has  determined 
whether  you  have  learned 
5%  or  95%  of  these 
questions. 
You  have  learned  50%  of 
these questions. 
 
x  The sequence of the questions is randomly determined. 
x  For a correct answer, you earn 2 points. 
x  For an incorrect answer, you lose 2 points. 
x  The option ﾓ“I do not knowﾔ” does not influence your score. 
You give your answer on a screen like this: On the top you see the number of answered 
questions. In the middle you see the question. Below the questions you find buttons for the 4 






Private account and group account (in the skill and education treatments) 
At the end of the 15 minutes the computer calculates how many points are in your private 
account and how many go into your group account. 
x  10% of the produced points go into your private income. If your score is negative, we 
deduct the 10% from your show-up fee. 
x  We substitute the remaining points with rank points, which depend on your score and 
the score of the other participants. The computer ranks the participants according to 
the number of points they have produced. Note that we rank all subjects (added in the 
education treatment: independent of the number of questions they have learned in the 
learning phase). The person with the lowest number of points receives 10 rank points, 
the  person  with  the  second  lowest  number  20  points,  the  person  the  third  lowest 
number 30 points and so on. The person with the highest number will receive 240 
points, if 24 persons are in the lab. If 2 or more persons have the same number of 
points, the computer assigns the rank points randomly. These assigned rank points go 
into the group account.  
 




If your point score is negative this has an impact on your private account but not on your 
group account. You will contribute at least 10 rank points to your group account. 
 
Example 1: You have answered 45 questions correctly  and  5  incorrectly.  You  earned  80 
points. The other group member has 35 correct answers and 10 wrong ones. She earned 50 
points. In comparison with the other participants you have earned the seventh lowest number 
of points, the other member the third lowest number. 
Your private income:      10% of 80      = 8 points  
Private income of the other member:10% of 50     = 5 points 
Your income in rank points 
the seventh lowest point score:   = 70 rank points 
The income of the other member in rank points 
the third lowest point score:  = 30 rank points 
Your group’s account: 70 rank points + 30 rank points = 100 points 
Example 2: You have answered 15 questions correctly and 20 incorrectly. You earned -10 
points. The other group member has 35 correct answers and 0 wrong ones. She earned 70 
points.  In  comparison  with  the  other  participants  you  have  earned  the  lowest  number  of 
points, the other member the eighth lowest number. 23 
 
Your private income:      10% of -10      = -1 point  
Private income of the other member:10% of 70     = 7 points 
Your income in rank points 
the lowest point score:   = 10 rank points 
The income of the other member in rank points 
the eigth lowest point score:  = 80 rank points 
Your group’s account: 10 rank points + 80 rank points = 90 points 
 
This calculation is identical for all subjects. You will see it on your screen. You will receive 
information about your private account and how much each group member has contributed to 
the group account (in rank points as well as in shares (%)). You keep your private earnings. 
You will bargain with the other group member about the distribution of the group account in 
the next phase. 
Private account and group account (in the Luck treatment) 
At the end of the 15 minutes the computer calculates how many points are in your private 
account and how many go into your group account. 
x  10% of the produced points go into your private income. If your score is negative, we 
deduct the 10% from your show-up fee.  
x  We substitute the remaining points with points you have drawn from an urn. 
 
Points from the Urn and the group account 
Your draw from the urn depends on the urn you draw from. There are two different urns. In 
the LOW urn you can draw between 10 and 120 points. In the HIGH urn, you can draw 
between 130 and 240 points. A die decides from which urn you may draw. 
A randomly chosen person in the lab throws a six-sided die and types into his computer 
whether the resulting number is odd or even. Your screen shows you from which urn you may 
draw in case of an odd number and from which in case of an even one. In each group of two 
persons, one person can draw from the high urn and one from the low urn. 
The conductors of the experiment will go around with the urn and you can make your draw. 
You will type the drawn number of points into the following screen. These points substitute 
your remaining points from the production phase. 24 
 
 
In the first line is the number of points you collected in the production phase. Below you see 
the  number  of  points  in  your  private  account  and  the  number  of  points  which  will  be 
substituted with points from the urn.  
The points from the urn go into a group account. Since the potential draws are distributed 
between 10 and 240 points, you contribute at least 10 points into the group account. 
 
Example 1: You have answered 45 questions correctly  and  5  incorrectly.  You  earned  80 
points. The other group member has 35 correct answers and 10 wrong ones. She earned 50 
points.  
Your private income:      10% of 80      = 8 points  
Private income of the other member:10% of 50     = 5 points 
You were able to draw from the high urn and drew 150 points. The other group member had 
to draw from the low urn and drew 20 points. These points substitute the remaining points 
from the production phase. 
Your group’s account: 150 urn points + 20 urn points = 170 points 
This calculation is identical for all subjects. You will see it on your screen. You receive 
information about your private account and how much each group member has contributed to 
the group account (in rank points as well as in shares (%)). You keep your private earnings. 




In the bargaining phase both group members bargain about the distribution of the points in the 
group account. Negotiations proceed as follows. There exists a role A and a role B. The group 
member with role A proposes a distribution of the points in the group account. The member 
with role B makes a claim for a minimum share of the group account that she wants to 25 
 
receive. If the proposed share of A for B is equal to or exceeds the minimum share demanded 
by B, the proposal of A is accepted and the negotiation ends. Negotiation fails if the proposed 
share is smaller than the minimum demand. In this case, 6 points are withdrawn from the 
group account and a new bargaining round starts. The bargaining phase can go on for several 
rounds until an agreement or until the group account is empty. In each round, roles A and B 
are assigned randomly to the group members.  
Detailed Procedure of a Bargaining Round 
1.  Decision as A: First both group members make a proposal about the distribution of the 
group account by stating a share (in percentages) for themselves and a share for the 
other group member. 
2.  Decision as B: In this second step, both group members state the minimum share of 
the group account they want to receive. 
3.  Afterwards, a lottery decides which member has role A and which member has role B. 
4.  The computer compares the proposal of A with the minimum demand of B: 
a.  An agreement is reached if the proposal of A is equal to or larger than Bﾒ’s 
minimum demand. In this case the points in the group account are distributed 
according to Aﾒ’s proposal. 
b.  There is no agreement if Aﾒ’s proposal is smaller than Bﾒ’s minimum demand. In 
this case the group account is reduced by 6 points and a new bargaining round 
starts.  
5.  In the next bargaining round both group members make a proposal for the distribution 
of the group account and a minimum demand.  
6.  Again, a lottery decides the assignment of roles A and B. 
7.  The computer compares the proposal of A with the minimum demand of B: 
The experiment ends once the group members reach an agreement or the group account is 
empty. In the latter case, no one receives a payment from the group account.  
Example 1: There are 100 points on the group account – 70 from you and 30 from the other 
group member. Both group members bargain about the distribution of this group account by 
making a proposal and a minimum demand.  
Your distribution proposal (for role A):  80%  for  you  and  20%  for  the  other  group 
member 
Your minimum demand (for role B): at least 70% for you 
The  distribution proposal of the other member(for role A):   
40% for herself and 60% for you. 
Her minimum demand (for role B):  at least 40% for herself 
A lottery decides that you are in role A and the other group member in role B. A comparison 
between your proposal and the minimum demand of the other group member shows that there 
is no agreement in this bargaining round. You proposed 20% to the other member, but she 
demanded at least 40%. 
Example 2: There are, again, 100 points on the group account – 70 from you and 30 from the 
other  group  member.  Both  group  members  bargain  about  the  distribution  of  this  group 
account by making a proposal and a minimum demand.  26 
 
Your distribution proposal (for role A):  60%  for  you  and  40%  for  the  other  group 
member 
Your minimum demand (for role B): at least 60% for you 
The  distribution proposal of the other member(for role A):   
40% for herself and 60% for you. 
Her minimum demand (for role B B):  at least 35% for herself 
A lottery decides that you are in role A and the other group member in role B. A comparison 
between your proposal and the minimum demand of the other group member shows that there 
is an agreement in this bargaining round. You proposed 40% to the other member, and she 
demanded at least 35%. 
The bargaining procedure on your screen. 
You type your proposal in the following screen. 
 
In the top left corner you see the contribution of each group member into the group account 
(in points). In the top right corner you see the current number of points in the group account 
and the current bargaining round. Below this information, you can make your proposal for 
role A. 
  27 
 
You will type your minimum demand in the following screen. 
 
In the top left corner is the contribution of each group member into the group account (in 
points). In the top right corner is the current number of points in the group account and the 
current bargaining round. Below this information, you can make your minimum demand for 
role B. 
A lottery decides which member has role A and which member has role B. The computer 
compares the proposal of A with the minimum demand of B: The bargaining ends once the 
group  members  reach  an  agreement  or  the  group  account  is  empty.  At  the  end  of  the 
bargaining, you can see your income and the experiment ends.  28 
 
Training Questions 
(From the education treatment: we adapted the questions for the other treatments) 
Please answer the following questions. They do not affect your final payment. Please signal if 
you have questions or once you have completed the answers. 
1)  In the production phase, you knew 95% of the questions from the learning phase.  You 
have answered 45 questions correctly and 10 incorrectly. The other group member 
knew 5% of the questions and has answered 20 questions correctly and 25 incorrectly. 
a.  How many points are in your private account? ________________________ 
b.  How  many  points  are  in  the  private  account  of  the  other  group  member? 
______________ 
2)  You  earned  60  points  in  the  production  period,  the  other  group  member  40.  In 
comparison with the other participants, you have the fifth lowest score and the other 
member the second lowest. 
a.  How many rank points do you get? __________________ 
b.  How many rank points does the other group member get? ________ 
c.  How many points are in the group account? __________________ 
3)  After the production phase, your group has 100 points in its account. You propose a 
share of 80% for yourself and 20% for the other group member and the lottery assigns 
role A to you. The other group member demands at least 10% for herself. 
a.  Is there an agreement? __________________________________ 
b.  If yes, how many points will you get? _______ 
c.  If yes, how many points will the other group member get? _______ 
4)  At the beginning of the third bargaining round, there are 138 points on your group 
account.  You  have  been  assigned  to  role  A  and  you  proposed  50%  of  the  group 
account for yourself and 50% for the other group member. This member demanded (in 
role B) at least 60% for herself. Therefore, bargaining fails and a new bargaining 
round starts. 
a.  How  many  points  are  on  the  group  account  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourth 
bargaining round? _____________________ 
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